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ORIGINALISM AS POPULAR
CONSTITUTIONALISM?: THEORETICAL
POSSIBILITIES AND PRACTICAL DIFFERENCES
Leef Strang*
INTRODUCTION

The common perception is that originalism and popular constitutionalism are incompatible. For example, historian Saul Cornell has
recently argued that "[p]opular constitutionalism was, and remains,
closer in spirit to modern ideas of a living constitution, and is therefore ultimately incompatible with all forms of originalism."I Supporting this perception is the widely-shared opinion that most advocates
for popular constitutionalism are libera 2 while most originalists are
@ 2011 Lee J. Strang. Individuals and nonprofit institutions may reproduce and
distribute copies of this article in any format, at or below cost, for educational
purposes, so long as each copy identifies the author, provides a citation to the Notre
Dame Law Review, and includes this provision in the copyright notice.
* Professor of Law, University of Toledo College of Law. Thank you to the
participants on the Originalism and Popular Constitutionalism panel at the 2010
Annual Law & Society Conference, and especially to Rebecca Zietlow for organizing
the panel and prompting this Article. I would also like to thank Lou Mulligan for his
characteristically thoughtful suggestions, Garrick Pursley, and the participants at the
University of Toledo College of Law workshop and the Ohio Legal Scholars workshop
for their comments. I would also like to gratefully acknowledge the research support
for this Article provided by the University of Toledo College of Law.
1 Saul Cornell, Heller, New Oiginalism, and Law Office History: "Meet the New Boss,
Same as the Old Boss, "56 UCLA L. REv. 1095, 1103 (2009); see also Ethan J. Leib, The
Perpetual Anxiety of Living Constitutionalism, 24 CONST. COMMENT. 353, 353 (2007)
(admonishing not to "think one can embrace Balkin's approach and a true living
constitutionalism at the same time"); Rory K. Little, Heller and ConstitutionalInterpretation: Originalism's Last Gasp, 60 HASTINGs L.J. 1415, 1429 (2009) ("It has recently
become fashionable to suggest that originalism and living constitutionalism are not
actually so incompatible.") (emphasis added).
2 By the labels liberal and conservative, I mean the standard set of claims that
correspond to the political realm. See Keith E. Whittington, Is Originalism Too Conservative?, 34 Hutv. J.L. & PUB. PoL'v 29, 33 (2011) ("The meaning of conservatism
varies both over time and within contemporary political discourse.").
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conservative-libertarian. 3 Not only is this the perception, it has a basis
in reality. Looking at the names of leading originalists and popular
constitutionalists 4 reveals that there is significant overlap between
originalism and conservatism-libertarianism, and between popular
constitutionalism and liberalism.
In this Article, I argue that the common perception that originalism and popular constitutionalism are incompatible is mistaken.
Instead, I show that there is no uniquely correct answer to the question of whether and/or how originalism is compatible with popular
constitutionalism. Stated more formally, there is no necessary analytical connection or disjunction between the two theories. Instead,
because of the theoretical compatibility of the two methods, the conceptual distance between popular constitutionalism and originalism
depends on the conception of originalism one is utilizing.5 With

some conceptions, the differences between popular constitutionalism
and originalism loom large. With others, the similarities emerge
prominently.
I argue that whether originalism converges with popular constitutionalism is contingent on the form of originalism in question. I
describe five axes upon which originalism pivots toward or away from
popular constitutionalism. These five axes are: (1) whether originalism embraces departmentalism in place of judicial interpretative
supremacy; (2) whether originalism requires judicial deference to
popular interpretative judgments; (3) the extent to which the Constitution's original meaning permits the popular branches to engage in
authoritative constitutional interpretation; (4) the extent to which the
popular branches authoritatively construct constitutional meaning
when the Constitution is underdetermined; and (5) whether originalism includes a place for nonoriginalist precedent.6 My description of
3 SeeJack Balkin, Protestant Constitutionalism:A Series of Footnotes to Sanford Levinson, BALKINIZATION (Sept. 17, 2010, 11:55 AM), http://balkin.blogspot.com/2010/
09/protestant-constitutionalism-series-of.html ("Thus, the idea of protestant constitutionalism helps us understand both modern liberal living constitutionalism and modern conservative originalism."); see also Whittington, supra note 2, at 29 ("Originalism
as an approach to constitutional theory and constitutional interpretation is often associated with conservative politics.").
4 See infra Parts I and II and the scholars discussed in each Part.
5 In this Article, I focus on half of the equation, originalism, and do not explore
the varieties of popular constitutionalism and how different forms of popular constitutionalism may make it more or less similar to originalism.
6 My goal is descriptive: I am not making a claim regarding which way originalism should pivot on the axes. Instead, my limited claim is that, given the nuances of
contemporary originalist scholarship, one cannot definitively describe the relationship between oiginalism and popular constitutionalism.
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these five axes shows that, in practice, originalism has failed to converge with popular constitutionalism.
This raises the question, however, of why originalism is identified
with conservative constitutional theory and popular constitutionalism
with liberal constitutional theory. I therefore offer three reasons why,
despite the theoretical compatibility of originalism and popular constitutionalism, they do not converge in perception and practice.
My argument proceeds in three parts. First, I describe popular
constitutionalism as a movement in the American legal academy. Second, I show that, despite their theoretical compatibility, in practice,
originalism's relationship to popular constitutionalism depends on
the conception of originalism one adopts. Third, I suggest three reasons for the liberal-conservative divide between originalism and popular constitutionalism despite their theoretical compatibility.
I.

THE (RECENT) RISE OF

PoPuiLR CONSTITUTIONALISM

Popular constitutionalism is the umbrella label for a family of
constitutional theorists.7 Popular constitutionalism's central commitment is to a greater popular role in the practice of constitutional
interpretation.8 Correspondingly, popular constitutionalists reject the
dominant view-judicial interpretative supremacy 9-which holds that
the Supreme Court's interpretations of the Constitution are authorita7 See Doni Gewirtzman, Glory Days: Popular Constitutionalism, Nostalgia, and the
True Nature of ConstitutionalCulture, 93 GEO. L.J. 897, 904 (2005) ("The act of unifying
a diverse and growing body of scholarship under the 'popular constitutionalism' mantle is something of a stretch."); see also Ilya Somin, The Tea Party Movement and Popular
Constitutionalism,105 Nw. U. L. REv. 300 (2011) (describing the Tea Party movement
as a popular constitutional movement).
8 See Gewirtzman, supra note 7, at 899 ("[Popular constitutionalists] argue[]
that the People and their elected representatives should-and often do-play a substantial role in the creation, interpretation, evolution, and enforcement of constitutional norms."); Todd E. Pettys, Popular Constitutionalism and Relaxing the Dead Hand:
Can the People Be Trusted?, 86 WASH. U. L. REv. 313, 316 (2008) (characterizing popular constitutionalists as arguing that "it is 'the People,' and not federal judges, who
hold the ultimate interpretative authority on disputed constitutional questions"); see
also Michael Serota, PopularConstitutionalInterpretation,44 CONN. L. REv. (forthcoming 2011) (advocating a greater role for the general populace in constitutional
interpretation).
9 Popular constitutionalists are not clear about whether they are challenging
judicial interpretative supremacy in toto, or only the supremacy of judicial judgments.
See Saikrishna Prakash & John Yoo, Against Interpretative Supremacy, 103 MICH. L. REV.
1539, 1550-51 (2005) (book review) (making this distinction).
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tive.1 o This description fits scholars from Richard Parker" through

Bruce Ackerman,12 Mark Tushnet,'5 Larry Kramer,14 Reva B. Siegel
and Robert C. Post,15 Jack Balkin,' 6 and Rebecca Zietlow. 17

10 See LARRY D.

KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM

ANDJUDICIAL REVIEW 139 (2004); see also Gewirtzman, supranote 7, at 899 (describing

popular constitutionalism as rejecting judicial interpretative supremacy).
11 Professor Parker's 1981 law review article arguably was the first modem call for
scholarship in the vein of popular constitutionalism. See Richard Davies Parker, The
Past of Constitutional Theory-And its Future, 42 OHIO ST. L.J. 223, 257 (1981) ("It is
open to us .

.

. to imagine a political life far different-far more democratic . . . .").

Professor Parker's more mature statement of his popular constitutionalist views is
found in RICHARD D. PARKER, "HERE, THE PEOPLE RULE" 95-96, 105, 113-14 (1994).
12 See BRUCE ACKERMAN, I WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 6-7 (1991); II BRUCE
ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS 5 (1998) [hereinafter ACKERMAN,
TRANSFORMATIONs]; Bruce Ackerman, The Living Constitution, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1737,

1805 (2007).
13 See MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS, at x
(1999) [hereinafter TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY] ("I attempt here to
develop an approach to thinking about the Constitution away from the courts in the
service of what I call a populist constitutional law."); see also MARK TUSHNET, WEAK
COURTS, STRONG RIGHTS 79-110 (2008) (arguing that legislatures are institutionally
competent to interpret constitutions).
14

See KRAMER, supra note 10, at 8.

15 See Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Protecting the Constitution from the People:
JuricentricRestrictions on Section Five Power, 78 IND. L.J. 1, 17-30 (2003) (criticizing the
purportedly "juricentric" view of Section Five embraced by the Rehnquist Court);
Reva B. Siegel, Dead or Alive: Originalism as Popular Constitutionalism in Heller, 122
HARv. L. REv. 191, 194 (2008) ("These practices of democratic constitutionalism
enable mobilized citizens to contest and shape popular beliefs about the Constitution's original meaning and so confer upon courts the authority to enforce the
nation's foundational commitments in new ways.").
16 SeeJack M. Balkin, Framework Originalismand the Living Constitution, 103 Nw. U.
L. REV. 549, 601 (2009) (rejecting judicial interpretive supremacy). Balkin's place in
the popular constitutionalist family is contested. See Leib, supra note 1, at 353 (concluding that Balkin's approach is fundamentally inconsistent with living constitutionalism). I believe that Balkin continues to fit in the popular constitutionalist camp
because of his embrace of popular interpretative supremacy. SeeJohn 0. McGinnis &
Michael Rappaport, Original Interpretive Principles as the Core of Originalism,24 CONST.
COMMENT. 371 (2007) [hereinafter McGinnis & Rappaport, InterpretivePrinciples] (criticizing aspects of Balkin's theory); see alsoJohn 0. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport,
OriginalMethods Originalism:A New Theory of Interpretation and the Case Against Construction, 103 Nw. U. L. REv. 751, 785 (2009) [hereinafter McGinnis & Rappaport, Original
Methods Originalism] (finding that Balkin's "theory of constitutional construction ...
gives pride of place to social movements").
17

REBECCA E. ZIETLOW, ENFORCING EQUALITY 9 (2006) (setting forth a description

of Congress's interpretative role).
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Judicial interpretative supremacy, in its strongest form-the one
18
most often the target of popular constitutionalists -is the claim that
the Supreme Court is the authoritative arbiter of constitutional meaning whose interpretations are binding on the other branches of government1 9 and on the American people. 20 Judicial interpretative
21
supremacy is clearly the dominant view on the Supreme Court, as it
is in the legal academy.2 2 There is also strong evidence that Americans perceive the Supreme Court as possessing interpretative
23
supremacy, at least in run-of-the-mill cases.
18

Keith Whittington recently turned the core popular constitutionalist commit-

ments-rejection ofjudicial interpretative supremacy and advocacy of popular constitutional interpretation-on their head. Whittington argued that judicial
interpretative supremacy is itself the product of political-popular-constitutional
See KEITH E. WHITTINcTON, POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS OF JUDICIAL
construction.
SUPREMACY 4 (2007); see also Barry Friedman, Mediated Popular Constitutionalism, 101
MICH. L. REv. 2596, 2598 (2003) (summarizing social science research as showing
popular support for the Supreme Court and judicial review).
19 See Walter F. Murphy, Who Shall Interpret? The Questfor the Ultimate Constitutional
Interpreter,48 REv. POL. 401, 407 (1986) (describing judicial interpretative supremacy
as the "obligation of coordinate officials not only to obey that judicial] ruling but to
follow its reasoning in future deliberations").

20

See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 865 (1992) ("The

Court's power lies, rather, in its legitimacy, a product of substance and perception

that shows itself in the people's acceptance of the Judiciary as fit to determine what
the Nation's law means and to declare what it demands.").
21 See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 536 (1997) ("When the Court has
interpreted the Constitution, it has acted within the province of the Judicial Branch,
which embraces the duty to say what the law is. When the political branches of the
Government act against the background of a judicial interpretation of the Constitution already issued, it must be understood that in later cases and controversies the
Court will treat its precedents with the respect due them under settled principles,
including stare decisis, and contrary expectations must be disappointed.") (internal
citation omitted); Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958) (claiming that the Supreme
Court's interpretations of the Constitution are the Constitution under the Supremacy
Clause).
22 See Prakash & Yoo, supra note 9, at 1561 ("In terms of academic views, it is
probably fair to say that the majority of scholars supportjudicial supremacy: the Court
enjoys interpretive supremacy such that its decisions bind the other branches not just
in the case before it but all other similar cases.").
23 See The Invisible Court, PEW RESEARCH CENTER (Aug. 3, 2010), http://pew
research.org/pubs/1688/supreme-court-lack-of-public-knowledge-favorability (showing public favorability of the Supreme Court ratings regularly above sixty percent); see
also Friedman, supranote 18, at 2598 (summarizing social science research as showing
popular support for the Supreme Court and judicial review); Gewirtzman, supra note
7, at 922 (describing the Supreme Court's "comparatively high levels of public
support").
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Beyond this consensus, however, popular constitutionalism fragments. Popular constitutionalists diverge primarily on the mechanisms by which nonjudicial constitutional interpretations manifest
themselves and the relationship of those interpretations to judicial
interpretations.24 Some popular constitutionalists maintain a significant role for the judiciary and argue that popular movements ultimately manifest their constitutional visions in judicial opinions that
"ratify" the movements' achievements.2 5
Others shunt the courts off to the side and propose that a significant proportion of constitutional interpretation occur in the popular
branches and/or in the populace itself.2 6 Some of these scholars suggest that social movements are the mechanism by which popular constitutionalism manifests itself.2 7 These social movements work
through a number of vehicles-political parties, electoral politics, litigation, advocacy groups, judicial appointments-to push their agendas through the elected branches and the courts.2 8 Perhaps most
provocatively, Dean Kramer argued that popular constitutionalism
may occur via direct popular action such as mobbing and
petitioning.2 9

24 See Pettys, supra note 8, at 321 (stating that "popular constitutionalists owe
their critics a persuasive response" on the question of how "the American people ...
exercise their interpretative power").
25 See Ackerman, supra note 12, at 1752 (stating that the Supreme Court must
"crystallize fixed points in our constitutional tradition" created by higher lawmaking);
see also Balkin, supra note 16, at 562 (describing the courts as ratifying changes
wrought by popular movements and institutions).
26 SeeJack M. Balkin & Reva B. Siegel, Principles, Practices, and Social Movements,
154 U. PA. L. REV. 927 (2006) (arguing that social movements modify the scope and
understanding of constitutional principles); Post & Siegel, supra note 15, at 3 (questioning the Supreme Court's Boerne limitations on congressional Section Five legislation); Siegel, supra note 15, at 192-95 (arguing that the Supreme Court in Heller was
giving voice to a popular constitutionalist movement advocating individual gun
rights).
27

See TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY, supra note 13, at 154 ("Doing

away with judicial review would have one clear effect: It would return all constitutional
decision-making to the people acting politically.").
28 See Randy Barnett, The Tea Party, the Constitution, and the Repeal Amendment, 105
Nw. U. L. REV. 281, 284-87 (2011) (describing the Tea Party-backed Repeal Amendment as a conservative popular constitutional movement whose goal is to utilize state
legislatures as popular checks on federal legislation).
29 See KRAMER, supra note 10, at 27-28, 108, 156, 241-48. For an argument that
popular constitutionalism fails because it depends on a civics-educated populace,
which the United States does not have, see Serota, supra note 8.
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Popular constitutionalism as a distinct scholarly phenomenonso
likely began with Sanford Levinson's ConstitutionalFaith, published in
1988.31 The movement gained steam in the 1990s with a spate of
scholarly interest.3 2 The culminating work in this genre is Larry
Kramer's The People Themselves: Popular Constitutionalism and judicial
34
Review, 33 published in 2004, to much acclaim and criticism.
The historical narrative frequently told by popular constitutionalists, however, argues that popular constitutionalism was the initial
3 5 They claim that
American form of constitutional interpretation.
popular constitutionalism was America's method of constitutional
interpretation at the Founding, and that it continued in prominence
until after the New Deal.3 6 Only in the twentieth century, the story
goes, did judicial supremacy come to dominate the American legal
system. Popular constitutionalists focus on important historical
moments in American legal and political history. For example, Dean
Kramer reviewed the Founding, the rise of Jacksonian democracy,
37
President Lincoln's challenge to Dred Scott, and the New Deal.
Popular constitutionalists have asserted a variety of normative
38
bases for popular constitutionalism, though the clear favorite is an
30

See Gewirtzman, supra note 7, at 897-98, 911-13 (describing the rise of popu-

lar constitutionalism as the triumph of the 1960s generation).
31 See SANFORD LEVINSON, CONSTITUTIONAL FATH 46-50 (1988) ("endorsing" the
protestant" view of constitutional law that requires individual interpretative authority). Although Professor Parker's 1981 law review article is earlier in time, it did not
contain the clear call found in Professor Levinson's book and in Parker's own 1994
book.
32 The next big scholarly step in this movement was Bruce Ackerman's WE THE

published in 1991, supra note 12.
33 KRAMER, supra note 10.
34 A wide-ranging symposium on Dean Kramer's book was held in the ChicagoKent Law Review. Symposium, The People Themselves: Popular Constitutionalismandjudicial Review, 81 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 809 (2006). The most powerful criticism of Kramer's
book is Larry Alexander & Lawrence B. Solum, Popular?Constitutionalism?, 118 HARv.
L. REv. 1594 (2005) (book review).
35 Dean Kramer is most famous for making this claim. See generally KRAMER, supra
note 10 (arguing that American history reveals that popularly elected officials held
control over a not-yet-powerful Court).
36 See id. at 219 (describing the "New Deal settlement" as judicial deference on
issues involving grants of power and rigorous judicial review on issues involving individual rights).
37 See generally id. (discussing events of the Founding era and arguing that contemporary constitutional theory was consistent with the modem theory of popular

PEOPLE,

constitutionalism).
38 See ZIETLOw, supra note 17, at 1 ("In this book I ... question the primacy of
federal courts as protectors of individual rights, and present an alternative picturethat of Congress, the majoritarian branch, protecting equality norms."); Gewirtzman,
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appeal to democracy.3 9 Popular constitutionalists argue that, by
privileging Supreme Court constitutional interpretations, democracy
is undermined and the Supreme Court's countermajoritarian position
is aggravated. 40 As Larry Kramer summarized: "The Supreme Court is
not the highest authority in the land on constitutional law. We are." 4 1
Some popular constitutionalist scholars have attempted to explicitly tie originalism to popular constitutionalism. This occurs in a
couple of ways. One is to argue that originalism is itself a manifestation of popular constitutionalism. On this reading, originalism is the
legal correspondent to a conservative political-Republican Partyand religious-evangelical Protestant and traditional Catholic-social
movement in the United States. 42
The second mode of tying originalism to popular constitutionalism is the most interesting, and it is primarily the work of popular
constitutionalist Jack Balkin.4 3 Professor Balkin has argued that
supra note 7, at 908 ("On the normative front, popular constitutionalism produces at
least two purported benefits: enhanced legitimacy and a greater capacity for self-definition."); see also TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY, supra note 13, at 153
(arguing that judicial interpretative supremacy is virtually neutral in the good and
bad consequences it causes).
39 See Ackerman, supra note 12, at 1754 ("The aim of interpretation is to understand the constitutional commitments that have actually been made by the American
people . . . ."); Post & Siegel, supra note 15, at 20 (stating that law must be "responsive
to political self-determination if it is to retain legitimacy in a democratic state"); see
alsoJared A. Goldstein, Can PopularConstitutionalism Survive the Tea Party Movement?,
105 Nw. U. L. REV. 288, 291 (2011) (arguing that the Tea Party popular constitutional
movement shows that popular constitutionalism is not necessarily democracyenhancing).
40 See Reva B. Siegel, Heller & Originalism'sDead Hand-in Theory and Practice,56
UCLA L. REV. 1399, 1401 (2009) (stating that, although originalism in theory suffers
from the "dead hand" critique, in practice it does not because originalism is itself a
popular constitutionalist movement); see also TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION
AWAY, supra note 13, at 194 (concluding that popular constitutionalism is the means
for the people "to reclaim [the Constitution] from the courts"). But see Friedman,
supranote 18, at 2598-99 (arguing that this popular constitutionalist empirical claim
is false).
41 KRAMER, supra note 10, at 248.
42 See Siegel, supra note 15, at 217 (identifying originalism with political conservatism); see also Balkin, supra note 16, at 609-10 (making this claim).
43 There is a scholarly dispute over the extent to which an attempt to synthesize
popular constitutionalism and originalism, like Balkin's, is possible. Ethan Leib has
argued that, in principle, the two are irreconcilable because of originalism's commitment to the exclusive use of history, at least at the "interpretation" stage of constitutional analysis. See Leib, supranote 1, at 356-57 (arguing that history is determinative
for originalist "[fjirst-order constitutional interpretation," while other modalities play
a role in living constitutionalism). My reading of the popular constitutionalist literature is that most popular constitutionalists do not exclude reliance on the Constitu-
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originalism, properly understood, is of-a-piece with living constitutionalism.44 He calls this the method of "text and principle."4 5
According to Balkin, fidelity to the Constitution requires interpreters to adhere to its text's original meaning and the principles
underlying that meaning.4 6 However, the Constitution's original
meaning and principles will regularly not determine the outcome of
constitutional issues, 47 making them subject to constitutional construction.48 It is in this zone of construction that popular constitutionalism takes over and constructs meaning.4 9
Balkin claimed that his synthesis incorporates the normative
attractiveness of both originalism and popular constitutionalism: it is
faithful to the Constitution's determinate original meaning while at
the same time responsive to current democratic popular
movements.5 0
Before proceeding, it is important to note that my description of
popular constitutionalism is thin.5 1 It leaves out much of the nuance
that populates the literature. Relatedly, I focused on American popular constitutionalists who in turn concentrated on the United States
Constitution. Therefore, I have omitted theorists that resemble popution's original meaning and, instead, frequently rely heavily upon it. Bruce
Ackerman, Larry Kramer, and Rebecca Zietlow are examples of this approach.
44 See Steven G. Calabresi & Livia Fine, Two Cheersfor ProfessorBalkin's Originalism,
103 Nw. U. L. REv. 663 (2009) (reviewing Balkin's attempted synthesis of originalism
and living constitutionalism); see also Larry Alexander, The Method of Text and ?:Jack
Balkin's Originalism with No Regrets (unpublished manuscript) (criticizing Balkin's
attempted synthesis), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract
id=1924568 (visited Oct. 7, 2011).
45 Balkin, supra note 16, at 551.
46 See id. at 552.
47 The most common reason for this indeterminacy, at least in Balkin's writing, is
that the Constitution's textually expressed principles are articulated at such a high
level of generality that their application to concrete circumstances is indeterminate.
See id. at 553; see also PeterJ. Smith, How Different are Originalism and Non-Originalism?,
62 HASTINGs L.J. 707, 707 (2011) (arguing that Balkin's and other new originalists'
utilization of abstract originalist principles has blurred or eliminated any distinction
between originalism and living constitutionalism).
48 See Balkin, supra note 16, at 553-57.
49 See id. at 554.
50 See id. at 551-52, 554-55.
51 My descriptions of both popular constitutionalism and originalism are thin in
order to evaluate whether they are compatible on those core points upon which the
respective theorists agree. This is a common approach. See, e.g., Randy E. Barnett,
Interpretation and Construction, 34 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 65, 66 (2011) (providing a
thin description of originalism); David E. Pozen, judicialElections as Popular Constitutionalism, 110 COLUM. L. REv. 2047, 2054-59 (2010) (laying out the "core" propositions of popular constitutionalism).
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lar constitutionalists, but who are distinct enough not to merit
discussion.
For example, Professor John Gardner has recently argued that
written constitutions, in principle, must change. 5 2 Gardner utilized
the tenets of legal positivism and argued that, though written constitutions are possible,5 3 they degrade very quickly because of the practice
of judicial application of the written constitution in cases. 5 4 According to Gardner, through judicial interpretations of the original written
constitution, constitutional law will inevitably change and come to
incorporate, as part of the written constitution, the judicial decisions
interpreting and applying the original written constitution.5 5
Gardner's account of constitutional operation has some affinity
to popular constitutionalism because of its strong commitment to constitutional change. However, Gardner's constitutional theory appears
to accept judicial interpretative supremacy 6 and, at least at this point
in its development, does not address popular interpretative input.
Therefore, I do not include Gardner's work within the family of popular constitutionalism.

II.

ORIGINALISM AS POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM?

A.

The Many Originalisms

Originalism is also a family of theories of constitutional interpre-

tation; it is not monolithic.5 7 Originalists have grounded originalism
in different normative theories,5 8 they have identified different
52 John Gardner, Can There Be a Written Constitution?, (May 8, 2009) (unpublished
manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1401244 (manuscript on file with
author).
53 See id. at 33.
54 See id. at 35.
55 See id. at 40.
56 See id. at 36 (stating that contestants in the debate over interpretation of the
American Constitution assume that constitutional law "will be developed, and that it
will be developed by judges").
57 For an argument that the diversity of originalist approaches has eliminated
originalism as a coherent theory see Thomas B. Colby & Peter J. Smith, Living
Orginalism,59 DUKE L.J. 239, 239 (2009); Smith, supra note 47, at 707 (arguing that
originalism's evolution has undermined its distinctness).
58

See

RANDY

E. BARNETr,

RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION 109

(2004) (argu-

ing that originalism best protects natural rights); KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL
INTERPRETATION 110-59
(1999) (grounding originalism in popular
sovereignty); John 0. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Our SupermajoritarianConstitution, 80 TEX. L. REV. 703, 802-05 (2002) (arguing that originalism is justified
because it protects the good consequences that arise from the Constitution's
supermajority requirements); Lee J. Strang, The Clash of Rival and Incompatible Philo-
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5 9 and originalists have articulated
sources of constitutional meaning,

different approaches when the Constitution's original meaning is
underdetermined.6 0
B.

Originalism'sFocal Case

The central meaning, or focal case,6 ' of originalism is character62
ized by two theses: the fixation thesis and the contribution thesis.
The fixation thesis states that the Constitution's meaning was fixed
when its text was ratified.6 3 The contribution thesis holds that the
Constitution's meaning contributes to the content of constitutional
law. 6 4 The fixation and contribution theses fit all or nearly all versions
of originalism. 6 5 For example, the theses fit both original intent and
original meaning originalism.
sophical Traditions Within ConstitutionalInterpretation:OriginalismGrounded in the Central
Western Philosophical Tradition, 28 HARv. J.L. & PuB. POL'Y 909, 983-97 (2005) (showing that originalism leads to the most human flourishing). Lawrence Solum has also
argued that one version of originalism, what he calls Semantic Originalism, is compatible with most normative justifications for originalism. Lawrence B. Solum, Semantic
http://
Originalism,at 128-34 (Nov. 22, 2008) (unpublished manuscript), availableat
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=1 120244.
59 Originalists are divided into original meaning, original intent, original methods, and original understanding camps. Currently, the most prominent are original
meaning originalists who include Keith Whittington, Randy Barnett, and Lawrence
Solum. Original intent is the oldest version of originalism, and it appears to be making a comeback. The most prominent original intent originalists are Richard Kay,
Larry Alexander, and Saikrishna Prakash. There are few original understanding
originalists, the most prominent being Robert Natelson. The newest form of originalism is original methods originalism articulated by Professors McGinnis and Rappaport. See McGinnis & Rappaport, Original Methods Originalism, supra note 16, at
751. For a review of the different forms of originalism, see id. at 758-65.
60 I describe the various approaches in Part II.C.4, infra.
61 For a discussion of the concept of focal case, see JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAw
AND NATURAL RIGHTS 9-11 (2d ed. 2011).
62 For the most thorough discussion of these theses in print see Lawrence B.
Solum, District of Columbia v. Heller and Originalism, 103 Nw. U. L. REv. 923, 944,
954 (2009) [hereinafter Solum, Originalism]; see also Lawrence B. Solum, What is
Originalism? The Evolution of Contemporary Originalist Theory 29-32, in THE CHALLENGE
or ORIGINALISM (Grant Huscroft & Bradley W. Miller eds., forthcoming 2011) [hereinafter Solum, Evolution], available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstractid=1825543 (describing the theses); Barnett, supra note 51, at 66 (providing
a slightly different statement of originalism's core propositions).
63 See Solum, Originalism, supra note 62, at 944, 954.
64 See id. Constitutional law is the label for the rules of law and legal doctrines
articulated in Supreme Court constitutional precedent.
65 See Solum, Evolution, supra note 62, at 33 (concluding that "[a]ll or almost all
originalists agree" with the theses).
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The focal case of originalism, embodied in the fixation and contribution theses, is formally consistent with popular constitutionalism. 6 6 First, the Constitution's fixed meaning may permit (or require)
popular participation in interpretation and/or reduced judicial interpretative supremacy. Second, the Constitution's fixed meaning may
permit (or require) factors other than or in addition to its fixed original meaning-such as (current) popular interpretations-to contribute to the content of constitutional law. Of course, originalism may
also, consistent with these theses, prohibit popular interpretations,
require judicial interpretative supremacy, and exclude nonoriginalist
factors from constitutional law.
Therefore, originalism is theoretically compatible with popular
constitutionalism, and originalism's practical consistency with popular
constitutionalism is-at least at this stage in its development-contingent. It is contingent on at least five axes, described below. Different
conceptions of originalism, as described below, will pivot on these five
axes making them more or less like popular constitutionalism.
One last note before proceeding: my description of originalism
is, like my account of popular constitutionalism, thin. This thin
account permits me to elide the difficult challenges presented by
deciding what the best conception of originalism is, and then comparing that conception to popular constitutionalism. My thin account
also opens up the question that a thicker account would obscure:
since, in principle, originalism and popular constitutionalism are consistent, what accounts for the lack of practical convergence and the
corresponding popular perception of divergence? I answer this question in Part III.
C.

Originalism as Popular ConstitutionalismDepends on how
OriginalismPivots on Five Axes

Different conceptions of originalism fit more or less well with
popular constitutionalism's central tenet of popular involvement in
the practice of constitutional interpretation and its corresponding
rejection of judicial interpretative supremacy. The extent to which
originalism conforms to or diverges from popular constitutionalism
depends on how the particular form of originalism pivots on these five
axes: (1) whether originalism embraces departmentalism in place of
66 I earlier noted some theorists whose positions have a resemblance to popular
constitutionalism, such as John Gardner. Gardner's conclusion that constitutions,
including written constitutions such as our own, must change means that his theory is
inconsistent with the fixation thesis, which states that the Constitution's meaning is
fixed and remains so.
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judicial interpretative supremacy; (2) whether originalism requires
judicial deference to popular interpretative judgments; (3) the extent
to which the Constitution's original meaning authorizes the popular
branches to engage in authoritative constitutional interpretation; (4)
the extent to which the popular branches authoritatively construct
constitutional meaning when the Constitution is underdetermined;
and (5) whether originalism includes a place for nonoriginalist precedent. These five axes upon which originalist affinity with popular constitutionalism turns shows that, at least as currently developed, there is
no essential relationship between originalism and popular constitutionalism. There is also no necessary estrangement between them.
1. Axis One: Departmentalism
First, some originalists have adopted departmentalism in place of
judicial interpretative supremacy as the governing relationship among
6 7 I label this strain of
the branches of the federal government.
68
originalism "original departmentalism." These originalists fit a core
popular constitutionalist tenet.
67 See WHITFINGTON, supra note 18, at 161-65 (describing the politically constructed foundations of judicial interpretative supremacy and its eclipse of
departmentalism).
68

It is not clear what percentage of originalists are departmentalists. Among the

originalist scholars who have written in favor of some form of departmentalism are
Michael Stokes Paulsen, Garry Lawson, Steven Calabresi, Saikrishna Prakash, John
Yoo, and John Harrison. See Steven G. Calabresi, Caesarism, Departmentalism,and Professor Paulsen, 83 MINN. L. REv. 1421, 1421 (1999); John Harrison, judicial Interpretive
Finality and the ConstitutionalText, 23 CONST. COMMENT. 33, 33-34 (2006); Gary Lawson & Christopher D. Moore, The Executive Power of Constitutional Interpretation, 81
IOWA L. REv. 1267, 1270 (1996); Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Most Dangerous Branch:
Executive Power to Say What the Law Is, 83 GEo. L.J. 217, 221 (1994); Prakash & Yoo,
supra note 9, at 1541; see also Michael W. McConnell, Comment, Institutions and Interpretations: A Critique of City of Boerne v. Flores, 111 HARv. L. REv. 153, 155 (1997)
(arguing for a form of departmentalism in the context of Congress exercising its Section Five powers); Saikrishna Bangalore Prakash, The Executive's Duty to Disregard
UnconstitutionalLaws, 96 GEO. L.J. 1613, 1672-73 (2008) (concluding that the President's power to disregard unconstitutional laws exists independently of federal court
determinations on the matter); Keith E. Whittington, ExtrajudicialConstitutionalInterpretation: Three Objections and Responses, 80 N.C. L. REv. 773, 779 (2002) (arguing that
defenses ofjudicial interpretative supremacy "make empirical, analytical, and normative errors"). It also appears that Lawrence Solum, Larry Alexander, Randy Barnett,
and Keith Whittington, are not departmentalists. See BARNETT, supra note 58, at 254;
WHirrINGTON,

supra note 18, at 4; Larry Alexander & Frederick Schauer, Defending
CoNsT. COMMENT. 455, 455-58 (2000); Alexander &

judicial Supremacy: A Reply, 17

Solum, supra note 34, at 1628-29.
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Departmentalism is the idea that each branch of government has
interpretative supremacy regarding those subjects and actions within
its purview. As an example, the creation of a federal statute involves
the judgments of Congress and the President69 that the statute is constitutional,70 paradigmatic examples of popular constitutionalism. If
the Supreme Court declared the statute unconstitutional in an Article
III case, the other branches could continue to advance their different
constitutional interpretation(s) through many means, including passage of an identical statute. This pattern occurred, for instance,
regarding desecration of the United States Flag.71
Within originalism, there are a variety of flavors of departmentalism. The most robust version of original departmentalism is Professor
Michael Stokes Paulsen's.7 2 Paulsen has argued that each branch of
the federal government has interpretative supremacy within its zone
of authorized activities.7 3 For Paulsen, this entails the presidential
power to "refuse to execute . .. judicial decrees that he concludes are
contrary to law." 74
Most others in the original departmentalism camp push less
strongly against judicial interpretative supremacy. These "moderate"
departmentalists agree with Paulsen's and departmentalism's core
thesis: each branch of the federal government has interpretative
authority within its sphere of power.75 However, they diverge from
Paulsen by arguing that there is a legitimate form of judicial
supremacy. Moderate originalist departmentalists contend that the
'judicial power" federal judges exercise makes federal court judgments
69 Absent a presidential veto override.
70 See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 945-46 (1983).
71 The Supreme Court struck down Texas' prohibition on desecrating the United
States flag in Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989). In response, Congress passed the
Flag Protection Act of 1989, which prohibited flag desecration. Flag Protection Act of
1989, Pub. L. No. 101-131, 103 Stat. 777, (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 700 (2010)), invalidated by United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310 (1990). In doing so, Congress and the
President exercised independent judgment.
72 See Michael Stokes Paulsen, Protestantismand ComparativeCompetence: A Reply to
Professors Levinson and Eisgruber, 83 GEO. L.J. 385 (1994); Paulsen, supra note 68, at
217; Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Merryman Power and the Dilemma ofAutonomous Executive Branch Interpretation,15 CARDozo L. REV. 81 (1993).
73 Paulsen, supra note 68, at 221.
74 Id. at 222.
75 See Calabresi, supra note 68, at 1422; see also McConnell, supra note 68, at 171
("The congressional power to interpret the Fourteenth Amendment for purposes of
passing Section Five enforcement legislation is one instance of the general principle
that each branch of government has the authority to interpret the Constitution for
itself, within the scope of its own powers.").
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binding.7 6 Therefore, the President must respect the Supreme
Court's judgment in a particular case by enforcing it.
These moderate originalist departmentalists are at pains to
emphasize that judicial supremacy is limited to federal court judgments, not federal court opinions and the interpretative analyses
employed in those opinions. The practical result of this judgmentopinion dichotomy is that the President and Congress can develop
independent interpretations of the Constitution while, at the same
time, federal judicial power is preserved.
Regardless of its form, original departmentalism fits closely with
popular constitutionalism.7 7 Original departmentalism removes the
Supreme Court from a privileged role in matters of constitutional
interpretation and incentivizes the more electorally accountable institutions. A number of originalists fall into this camp.
2.

Axis Two: Judicial Deference to Popular Interpretative
Judgments

The second and third axes are related. These axes focus on the
extent to which the Constitution's original meaning permits popular
democratic processes to decide interpretative issues. The Constitution's original meaning could privilege popular processes in two ways:
first, the Constitution could require significant judicial deference to
popular democratic processes, commonly referred to as judicial
restraint; and, second, the Constitution's original meaning could
authorize wide scope to popular interpretative processes themselves. I
will address each axis in turn.
Regarding the second axis, judicial deference, the more the Constitution mandates judicial deference to popular constitutional judgments, the closer to popular constitutionalism originalism moves. As I
explain below, today few originalists subscribe to a broad constitutional requirement of judicial deference.
In its modern infancy,78 many originalists grounded originalism
in "judicial deference" or 'judicial restraint." Judicial restraint is the
76
77

See Calabresi, supra note 68, at 1425.
Cf Pettys, supra note 8, at 318-19 (arguing that there is "a tight connection

between originalism and judicial supremacy").

78 I use the phrase "modern infancy" because originalism was the interpretative
methodology until the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries. SeeJOHNATHAN
O'NEILL, ORIGINALISM IN AMERICAN LAW AND POLITICS 12-28 (2005); CHRISTOPHER
WOLFE, THE RISE OF MODERN JUDICIAL REVIEW 3 (rev. ed. 1994). The period with

which I am concerned in this Article is originalism's modern incarnation beginning
in the 1970s, with the publication of Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First
Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1 (1971), and RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BYJUDICI-
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idea that judges will strike down only clearly unconstitutional laws. 79
If a law is not clearly unconstitutional, a restrained court will defer to
the other branches' constitutional judgments.8 0 Early originalists
made the claim that originalism was better than nonoriginalism
because restrained originalist judges would strike down democratically
adopted laws less frequently than their nonoriginalist counterparts.,
Today, most originalists have abandoned that normative claim. Not
all have, however. And for these "deference originalists," originalism
provides a broad scope for popular constitutional activity.
A prominent early proponent of deference originalism was Robert Bork. Bork advocated something like a clear error rule.8 2 In The
Tempting of America, Bork stated that if a 'judge . . . cannot make out
the meaning of a provision," the judge does not have a constitutional
warrant to rule a governmental act unconstitutional.83
Most originalists have moved away from judicial deference, for a
variety of reasons. Keith Whittington was central to the originalist
move away from judicial restraint as a justification for originalism. 84
Professor Whittington argued that there was no originalist reason for
judges to strike down only clearly unconstitutional laws.85 Instead,
judges have a constitutional duty to strike down legislation that is, in
the judges' judgment, unconstitutional. 86
(2d ed. 1997); see also William H. Rehnquist, The Notion of a Living Constitution,54
TEX. L. REV. 693 (1976) (providing an early articulation of originalism).
79 Professor Ernest Young helpfully surveyed the various conceptions of judicial
restraint and activism, and concluded that judicial restraint means "defer to other
sorts of authority at the expense of its own independent judgment about the correct
legal outcome." Ernest A. Young, Judicial Activism and Conservative Politics, 73 U.
COLo. L. REV. 1139, 1145 (2002); see also RicHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS
320 (1996) ("[U]nless the court is acting contrary to the will of the other branches of
government, it is not being 'activist' in the sense I should like to see become canonical."). Of course, many definitions of judicial restraint have been offered. See, e.g.,
Thomas W. Merrill, Originalism, Stare Decisis and the Promotion ofJudicial Restraint, 22
CONST. COMMENT. 271, 274-75 (2005) (defining judicial restraint as "judging that
produces the fewest surprises" under existing law).
80 For the canonical formulation of this position, see James B. Thayer, The Origin
and Scope of the American Doctrine of ConstitutionalLaw, 7 HARv. L. REv. 129, 144 (1893);
see also Steven G. Calabresi, Thayer's ClearMistake, 88 Nw. U. L. REV. 269 (1993) (offering multiple criticisms of Thayer's proposal).
81 See O'NEILL, supra note 78, at 129 (stating that early originalism was
"majoritarian" and "restraint" oriented).
82 See ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA 166 (1990).
83 Id.
84 See WHITTINGTON, supra note 58, at 41-44.
85 Id.
86 Id.; cf McGinnis & Rappaport, OriginalMethods Originalism, supra note 16, at
774-75 (arguing that there is no room in originalist analysis for constitutional conARY
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There remain, however, originalists who, at least in some limited
circumstances, advocate judicial deference. Professor Michael
McConnell, for instance, has argued that the Supreme Court should
defer to congressional judgments under Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment.8 7 The reasons for deference, however, are lim88
ited to this context.
In principle, originalism is compatible with living constitutionalism on this axis. In practice, however, originalism and popular constitutionalism have significantly diverged as originalists have abandoned
an earlier overarching commitment to judicial deference to popular
interpretative judgments.
3.

Axis Three: Popular Interpretative Authority

The third axis is the extent to which the Constitution's original
meaning authorizes the popular branches to engage in authoritative
constitutional interpretation. Stated differently, this axis focuses on
the scope of initial interpretative authority lodged in the elected
branches. The Constitution could privilege popular constitutional
interpretation in two ways. 8 9
First, the Constitution's original meaning could authorize wide
scope to popular constitutional interpretation. For example, Section
Five of the Fourteenth Amendment may grant Congress broad authority both in terms of articulating the interests protected in Section
One, and in terms of what counts as "enforce [ment]," or remedial
legislation, under Section Five itself. Whether Section Five, in fact,
does so is contingent on the historical fact of the text's original
meaning.
Second, the Constitution's original meaning may place relatively
few "external" limits on popular interpretative activity. External limits
are constitutional prohibitions that proscribe governmental activity in
areas that the government would otherwise have interpretative authority.9 0 Continuing the Fourteenth Amendment example from above:
struction because "[w]hen the interpretation of language was unclear, the interpreter
would consider the relevant originalist evidence-evidence based on text, structure,

history, and intent-and select the interpretation that was supported more strongly by
the evidence").
87 See McConnell, supra note 68, at 184.
88 See id. at 185.
89 These divergent approaches apply to the popular political processes of both
the federal and state governments.
90 See Randy E. Barnett, Introduction:James Madison's Ninth Amendment, in 1 THE
RIGHTs RETAINED BY THE PEOPLE 14 (Randy E. Barnett ed., 1989) (describing the
"power-constraint conception of constitutional rights" which holds that "enumerated
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states have a broad residual police power to regulate. If Section One
does not significantly limit state legislative action, then it is not a
robust external limit and states therefore possess substantial initial
interpretative authority. Whether Section One leaves states free to
exercise their broad police powers is also a contingent historical
question.
These two factors-the scope of constitutional authorization and
external limits-are roughly captured by the divergence between libertarian and conservative originalists. One camp, the libertarian
originalists, narrowly construes popular interpretative authority and
broadly construes external limits.9 1 This leads to a relatively limited
scope for popular interpretative processes and robust external limits
on those processes.9 2 The other faction, conservative originalists,
more broadly construes popular constitutional authority and narrowly
construes external limits.9 3
Focusing on the Necessary and Proper Clause to exemplify the
first factor: Libertarian originalists narrowly construe the Clause's
grant of power to Congress.9 4 By contrast, conservative originalists
argue for a broader understanding of the Clause.9 5 Under the latter's
approach, Congress has greater initial popular interpretative
authority.
Second, much of the debate between these camps centers on
whether, and to what extent, the Constitution limits popular interpretative processes otherwise within the scope of governmental powers.
For libertarian originalists, such as Randy Barnett, both the Privileges
or Immunities Clause and the Ninth Amendment protect the exercise
of natural rights.9 6 So, the "external" limits imposed by the Privileges
or Immunities Clause and the Ninth Amendment significantly restrict
the acknowledged authority of the federal and state governments.
rights can potentially limit in some manner the exercise of powers delegated by other
provisions of the Constitution").
91 For the best libertarian originalist work, see BARNETT, supra note 58.
92 For criticism of libertarian originalism, see Andrew C. Spiropoulos, Rights Done
Right: A Critique of Libertarian Originalism, 78 UMKC L. REV. 661 (2010).
93 The most incisive critique of Barnett's RESTORING THE LosT CONSTITUTION,
supra note 58, is Steven G. Calabresi, The Originalistand Normative Case Against judicial
Activism: A Reply to Professor Randy Barnett, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1081 (2005) (book
review).
94 See Randy Barnett, The Choice Between Madison and IDR, 31 HARv. J.L. & PUB.
POL'Y 1005, 1012 (2008) (arguing for a narrow, "Madisonian" understanding of the
Necessary and Proper Clause).
95 See Calabresi & Fine, supra note 44, at 665-66; Michael Stokes Paulsen, A Government of Adequate Powers, 31 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 991, 991-92 (2008).
96 See BARNETT, supra note 58, at 54-68.
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Conservative originalists take a different approach. They sometimes argue that the Privileges or Immunities Clause and the Ninth
Amendment do not authorize judicially enforceable rights protection.9 7 More frequently, however, conservative originalists claim that
the Clause and Amendment do provide judicially enforceable limits
on the popular branches, though of a less robust sort than envisioned
by libertarian originalists.98 Professor Steven Calabresi has argued in
this vein that the rights protected by the Privileges or Immunities
Clause are only those deeply rooted in American history and
tradition.9 9
Similar debates over the scope of the Constitution's power conferring provisions occur regarding other constitutional text. The
greater the power conferred by the Constitution, the fuller the scope
of popular interpretative processes. Likewise, the less robust the limits
on government exercise of conferred powers, the closer originalism
approaches to popular constitutionalism.
Though there are a fair number of both types of originalists
populating the academy, conservative originalism comes closest to
popular constitutionalism. It does so by authorizing popular constitutional interpretation and narrowing constitutional restrictions on that
activity.
97 See The Bork Disinformers, WALL ST. J., Oct. 5, 1987, at 22 (using Bork's
(in)famous inkblot analogy regarding the Ninth Amendment); see also BoRK, supra
note 82, at 166 (using the inkblot analogy for the Privileges or Immunities Clause).
98 See Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 122 (1989) ("[W]e have insisted not
merely that the interest denominated as a 'liberty' be 'fundamental' . . . but also that
it be an interest traditionally protected by our society."); Kurt T. Lash, The Inescapable
Federalism of the Ninth Amendment, 93 IowA L. REv. 801, 807 (2008) ("[T]he Ninth
Amendment forbids reading the Privileges or Immunities Clause as negating the general police powers of the state. Thus, if my reading of the Ninth Amendment is correct, it would significantly undermine Barnett's theory of a libertarian Constitution.").
99 See Steven G. Calabresi & Nicholas P. Stabile, On Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment, 11 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1431, 1438-39 (2009) ("[Constitutionally protected] unenumerated rights are . .. rights that are deeply rooted in American history
and tradition and that can be overcome by the police power when the State enacts
general laws for the good of the whole people." (footnote omitted)); see also Kurt T.
Lash, The Origins of the Privileges or Immunities Clause, Part I: "Privilegesand Immunities"
as an Antebellum Term ofArt, 98 GEO. L.J. 1241, 1299 (2010) ("[T]he phrase 'privileges
and immunities of citizens of the United States' was consistently used as a reference to
federally conferred rights and privileges such as those listed in the Bill of Rights as
well as certain guarantees in Articles I, III, and IV."); Michael W. McConnell, The
Right to Die and the Jurisprudenceof Tradition, 1997 UTAH L. REv. 665, 692 ("If there is
any textually and historically plausible authorization for the protection of unenumerated rights, it is to be found in [the Privileges or Immunities Clause.]").
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Axis Four: Popular Constitutional Constructions

The fourth axis is the extent to which the Constitution's original
meaning empowers the popular branches to authoritatively construct
constitutional meaning. Many originalists' articulation of originalism
includes the concept of constitutional construction. 0 0 These
originalists diverge on which branch has the authority to authoritatively construct the Constitution's meaning.
Before specifically addressing this axis in more detail, let me step
back and briefly describe the concept of constitutional construction.' 0 Though there is an ongoing debate in originalist circles,
many originalists accept the distinction between constitutional interpretation and constitutional construction.1 0 2 Interpretation is the
process of articulating the Constitution's determinate original meaning.10 3 These are situations where the original meaning provides one
right answer to legal questions. For example, the Commerce Clause
determinatively grants Congress the authority to regulate the commercial transportation of goods in trains across state lines.1 04
Construction is the process of creating constitutional doctrine
within the bounds set by the Constitution's underdetermined meaning.10 5 For instance, the Republican Guarantee Clause likely does not
100 See Barnett, supra note 51, at 65-72 (defending originalism's incorporation of
construction).
101 For an in-depth discussion of the concept of constitutional construction, see
Solum, supra note 58, at 19-22, 75-79. For more recent discussions of construction,
see Barnett, supra note 51; Mitchell N. Berman, ConstitutionalConstructionsand ConstitutionalDecision Rules: Thoughts on the Carving of Implementation Space, 27 CONST. COMMENT. 39 (2010); Laura A. Cisneros, The Constitutional Interpretation/Construction
Distinction:A Useful Fiction, 27 CONsT. COMMENT. 71 (2010); Kermit Roosevelt III, Interpretation and Construction:Originalism and Its Discontents, 34 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 99
(2011); Solum, supra note 62; Keith E. Whittington, Constructinga New American Constitution, 27 CONST. COMMENT. 119 (2010).
102 The most articulate advocates of the non-construction position are Professors
John McGinnis and Michael Rappaport. See McGinnis & Rappaport, OriginalMethods
Originalism, supra note 16, at 783-86 (making a series of arguments against constitutional construction within originalism).
103 See WHITINGTON, supra note 58, at 5 ("[C]onstitutional interpretation is the
fairly familiar process of discovering the meaning of the constitutional text.").
104 See The Shreveport Rate Case, 234 U.S. 342 (1914) (upholding federal regulation of railroad rates); S. Ry. Co. v. United States, 222 U.S. 20 (1911) (upholding
federal railroad safety regulations).
105 See Lawrence B. Solum, On the Indeterminacy Crisis: Critiquing CriticalDogma, 54
U. CHI. L. REv. 462, 473 (1987) (describing the concept of underdeterminacy); see
also Ken Kress, A Preface to Epistemological Indeterminacy, 85 Nw. U. L. REV. 134, 138-39
(1990) (providing the first articulation of the distinction between epistemological and
metaphysical determinacy of law).
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answer the question of whether a state whose statehouse representa-

tion varies across districts violates Article IV.1 o6 It is in cases like thiswhere the original meaning limits but does not determine the outcome-that constitutional construction occurs. The output of consti0 7 the norms that
tutional construction is legal doctrine specifying'
10 8
govern particular situations.
Some originalists who accept the concept of construction have
argued that the Supreme Court has the authority to conclusively construct the Constitution's meaning. For example, Randy Barnett
claimed that, in situations of constitutional underdeterminacy, federal
09
courts must construct meaning using a presumption of liberty, and
1 1 0 This
that the elected branches must respect these constructions.
approach, its proponents claim, maximizes various goods, such as
individual liberty. 1 "
Others have contended that federal court constructions of constitutional meaning are defeasible in light of contrary constructions by
the elected branches.1 1 2 One of the primary arguments for this position is that judicial enforcement of constructions has no warrant in
the Constitution-because, by definition, the Constitution is

106 See Samuel B. Johnson, TheDistrict of Columbia and the Republican Form of Government Guarantee, 37 How. L.J. 333, 358-63 (1994) (reviewing the history and jurisprudence of the Republican Guarantee Clause). It is this indeterminacy that led the
Supreme Court to rule that Republican Guarantee Clause cases are nonjusticiable
political questions. Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1, 36 (1849).
107 See Lee J. Strang, An OriginalistTheory of Precedent: The PrivilegedPlace of Originalist Precedent, 2010 BYU L. REv. 1729, 1767 (defining specification as the process of
"mak[ing] explicit how the Constitution's original meaning resolves a particular legal
question").
108 See Solum, Originalism, supranote 62, at 979-80 (explaining that the process of
constitutional construction of the Second Amendment will occur via litigation); see
also Richard H. Fallon, Jr., judicially Manageable Standards and ConstitutionalMeaning,
119 HARv. L. REv. 1275 (2006) (explaining the New Doctrinalists' views which include
the idea that constitutional doctrine implements the constitution).
109 Barnett argued that this is necessary to ensure or enhance legitimacy. See BARNETr, supra note 58, at 126.
110 See id. at 118-30.
111 See id. at 126.
112 See WHI-TINGTON, supra note 58, at 5 (describing constitutional construction as
involving "the 'imaginative vision' of politics"); see also Lee J. Strang, The Role of the
Common Good in Legal and ConstitutionalInterpretation,3 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 48, 70-71
(2005) (arguing that the elected branches have authority to construct); cf Whittington, supra note 101, at 125-29 (concluding that courts play some role in constitutional construction).
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underdetermined on the point-and so the default prerogative of
democratic legitimacy governs. 1 3
This second form of originalism-which privileges elected
branch constructions-moves originalism in the direction of popular
constitutionalism. The extent to which originalism moves in that
direction depends on how many instances of construction exist. Most
originalists (who have adopted the concept of construction) agree
that there is potentially a significant role for construction.1 4 If this is
the case, then there are many facets of constitutional law that are
open to popular input. 1 5
A possible example of this is Congress's Commerce Clause
authority over interstate commercial transactions conducted via the
Internet.n 6 The Clause's original meaning is that Congress has the
authority to regulate the commercial transportation of goods and services across state lines.'" 7 This meaning arguably does not determine
the outcome of a case where Congress's regulation of the Internet is
challenged." 8 In this case, Congress would have the authority to construct the Clause's meaning to either include or exclude regulation of
the Internet, and any contrary court constructions would have to give
way. So, if the Supreme Court had previously constructed the Commerce Clause to exclude congressional regulation of some class of
Internet transactions, a later-contrary-federal statute would
control.
In sum, to the extent originalism incorporates constitutional construction, coupled with a commitment to authoritative elected branch
constructions, it moves closer to popular constitutionalism. Originalists are currently divided on the existence of construction and on
which branch's constructions are authoritative.
113 See WHITTINGTON, supra note 58, at 11 ("Constructions claim the fidelity of
political actors through their continuing political authority, not through judicial
enforcement.").
114 See, e.g., KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION: DIVIDED
POWERS AND CONSTITUTIONAL MEANING

12 (1999) (listing constitutional construc-

tions); see also Barnett, supra note 51, at 69 ("The original meaning of the text does
not definitively answer these and many other similar and important questions.").
115 See Balkin, supranote 16, at 559 (describing constitutional construction as the
"far larger task" than constitutional interpretation).
116 See Lee J. Strang, Originalism and the "Challenge of Change": Abduced-Principle
Originalism and Other Mechanisms by Which OriginalismSufficiently Accommodates Changed
Social Conditions, 60 HASTINGS L.J. 927, 980-81 (2009) (giving this example).
117

See BARNET,

supra note 58, at-313.

118 Cf Am. Libraries Ass'n v. Pataki, 969 F. Supp. 160, 172-73 (S.D.N.Y. 1997)
(ruling that the Internet was an instrumentality of commerce).
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Axis Five: Nonoriginalist Precedent

Originalism moves toward popular constitutionalism when it
incorporates nonoriginalist precedent. Nonoriginalist precedent is
federal court precedent that reaches a result inconsistent with the
Constitution's determinate original meaning.1 1 9 There is an ongoing
debate among originalists on the status of nonoriginalist precedent.
Some originalists including, most powerfully, Professor Gary Lawson, have argued that all (or almost all) nonoriginalist precedent is
without legal force.120 These "get-rid-of-it-all" originalists rest their
conclusion on the Supremacy Clause, which states that the Constitution-and not what the Supreme Court says about it-is the supreme
law of the land.121
Other originalists, including myself, have contended that
2 2 These
originalism preserves at least some nonoriginalist precedent.'
"precedential originalists" base their conclusion on a number of
119 As I explain in more detail in Strang, supra note 107, nonoriginalist precedent
is constitutional precedent that does not meet the standard of Originalism in Good
Faith. Originalism in Good Faith states that a precedent is an originalist precedent
only if it is an objectively good faith attempt to articulate and apply the Constitution's
original meaning.
120 Gary Lawson was the first originalist scholar to directly and prominently challenge nonoriginalist precedent. See Gary Lawson, The ConstitutionalCase Against Precedent, 17 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 23 (1994). Lawson later altered his conclusion
slightly by finding that "[a] court may properly use precedent if, but only if, the precedent is the best available evidence of the right answer to constitutional questions."
Gary Lawson, Mostly Unconstitutional:The Case Against Precedent Revisited, 5 AvE MARIA
L. REv. 1, 4 (2007).
121 See Randy E. Barnett, Trumping Precedent with Original Meaning: Not as Radical as
it Sounds, 22 CONsT. COMMENT. 257, 259 (2005) ("Accepting that judicial precedent
can trump original meaning puts judges above the Constitution . . . ."); Steven G.
Calabresi, Text vs. Precedent in ConstitutionalLaw, 31 HARv. J.L. & PuB. POL'Y 947, 947
(2008) (arguing that the Constitution "is controlling in most constitutional cases");
Steven G. Calabresi, Text, Precedent, and the Constitution: Some Originalistand Normative
Arguments for Overruling Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey,
22 CONST. COMMENT. 311, 315-16 (2005) (arguing that precedent trumps the original
meaning only when all three branches of the federal government have accepted the
precedent as "well-settled"); Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Intrinsically CorruptingInfluence of Precedent, 22 CONsT. COMMENT. 289, 289 (2005) (stating that "stare decisis ... is
completely irreconcilable with originalism").
122 See, e.g., Lee J. Strang, An OriginalistTheory of Precedent: Originalism,Nonoriginalist Precedent, and the Common Good, 36 N.M. L. REv. 419 (2006); see alsoJohn 0. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Reconciling Originalism and Precedent, 103 Nw. U. L. REv.
803, 803 (2009) ("[T]he Constitution as a matter of judicial power incorporates a
minimal notion of precedent.").
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bases 123 including the original meaning of 'judicial Power" in Article
I11.124
Precedential originalists come closer to popular constitutionalism
because nonoriginalist precedent is frequently the product of popular
social movements. Popular movements aiming toward constitutional
change sometimes embody their gains in constitutional text. The
Nineteenth Amendment, for instance, is the culmination of the
women's suffrage movement. 125
As many popular constitutionalists have argued, social movements have also frequently embodied their victories in Supreme Court
precedent.12 6 A prime example is the Progressive movement's goal of
utilizing the administrative state to ameliorate perceived harms caused
by industrialization and urbanization.1 2 7 The Supreme Court validated the administrative state in a series of nonoriginalist cases. 128
Consequently, to the extent that nonoriginalist precedent embodies
the results of social movements in this way, precedential originalism
preserves the policies of these social movements.

123 See Kurt T. Lash, Originalism, PopularSovereignty, and Reverse Stare Decisis, 93
VA. L. REv. 1437 (2007) (arguing that popular sovereignty-based originalism preserves
some nonoriginalist precedent); Lawrence B. Solum, The Supreme Court in Bondage:
ConstitutionalStare Decisis, Legal Formalism, and the Future of Unenumerated Rights, 9 U.
PA. J. CONsT. L. 155, 184-201 (2006) (arguing for a "neoformalist" conception of
constitutional precedent based primarily on its good consequences, such as respect
for Rule of Law values).
124 See Strang, supra note 122, at 419.
125 See PAUL JOHNSON, A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE 656-59 (1997)
(describing the gradual embrace of women's suffrage by Americans); see also AKHIL
REED AMAR, AMERICA'S CONSTITUTION 419-26 (2005) (summarizing the legal and
social changes that led to the Nineteenth Amendment); Lee J. Strang, Originalism, the
Declarationof Independence, and the Constitution:A Unique Role in ConstitutionalInterpretation?, 111 PENN ST. L. REv. 413, 421-23 (2006) (describing invocation of the Declaration of Independence by suffragettes).
126 See Ackerman, supra note 12, at 1742 ("It is judicial revolution, not formal
amendment, that serves as one of the great pathways for fundamental change marked
out by the living Constitution.").
127 See Balkin, supra note 16, at 561 (describing this phenomenon).
128 See, e.g., Nat'l Broad. Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 230 (1943) (holding
that the delegation to the FCC to grant broadcast licenses "if public convenience,
interest, or necessity will be served thereby" did not violate the Article I nondelegation doctrine (internal quotation omitted)); Humphrey's Ex'r v. United States, 295
U.S. 602 (1935) (validating independent agencies as not violating Article II); Crowell
v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22 (1932) (ruling that Article I courts' jurisdiction over public
rights was consistent with Article III).
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129 It is
There is a significant quantity of nonoriginalist precedent.
not clear what proportion of nonoriginalist precedent preserves the
work of social movements. There are indications, however, that many
nonoriginalist doctrines originated in social movements. For
instance, to the extent one characterizes the New Deal Court's
nonoriginalist work as embodying the New Deal's constitutional
vision, and to the extent one believes that the New Deal was the political manifestation of a popular constitutional movement, then preserving the nonoriginalist case law grounding the administrative state,
broad Commerce Clause authority, broad Spending Clause power,
and other prominent components of the New Deal edifice, moves
130
Other prominent
originalism toward popular constitutionalism.
31
doctrines that are nonoriginalistI precedential embodiments of popular constitutional movements may include: the modern women's
rights movement that culminated in heightened scrutiny for gender
classification under the Equal Protection Clause;1 32 the civil rights
movement that culminated in cases directly employing the Constitu1 34 doction 133 and validating statutes such as the Voting Rights Act;
1 35
trines placing the Court's imprimatur on changed sexual mores;
case law protecting criminal defendant rights;13 6 precedent protecting

129 See Strang, supranote 122, at 430 (" [T]he list of nonoriginalist precedents and
constitutional law doctrines built on these precedents is long .. . .").

130 See Balkin, supra note 16, at 562 ("Landmark precedents like the New Deal
decisions became durable precisely because so much of the developing structure of
governance depended on their construction of the Constitution.").
131 Popular constitutionalists argue that the gun rights movement that secured a
goal in District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008), presents an example of popular constitutionalism. See Balkin, supra note 16, at 594-97. Since Heller is an originalist precedent, see Strang, supra note 107, at 1731 (describing originalist precedent and
its privileged status), it is not included in the list.
132 E.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
133 E.g., Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
134 E.g., Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966).
135 E.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479
(1965).
136 E.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S.
335 (1963); see also William N. Eskridge, Jr., Some Effects of Identity-Based Social Movements on ConstitutionalLaw in the Twentieth Century, 100 MICH. L. REv. 2062, 2194-2225
(2002) (describing the Supreme Court's criminal procedure protections as the product of a social movement).
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nontraditional "property;"1 37 and recent cases utilizing more-thanrational-basis scrutiny for sexual orientation classifications.13

III.

EXPLAINING THE DIVERGENCE BETWEEN

THEORY AND PRACTICE

A. Introduction
Up to this point I have argued, in the face of the common
assumption that originalism and popular constitutionalism are incompatible, that there is no theoretical support for the assumption. I then
argued that, despite their theoretical congruence, for each of the five
axes, originalism did not converge with popular constitutionalism. In
this part, I offer three explanations for this divergence between theory
and practice: (1) conservative and liberal legal thought have their natural homes in originalism and popular constitutionalism respectively
(the "Historical Explanation"); (2) the ideological makeup of the
legal academy, combined with originalism's perceived conservative
ties, pushed liberal legal scholars unhappy with the Rehnquist and
Roberts Courts to avoid originalism and articulate popular constitutionalism (the "Sociological Explanation"); and (3) the conservativelibertarian ideological commitments of originalists have caused a practical divergence on five axes away from popular constitutionalism (the
"Realist Explanation").
Before describing the three causes in more detail, let me pause to
note that Jack Balkin's recent work exemplifies and supports my
claim. Balkin's recent scholarship explicitly attempts to build a bridge
between originalism and popular constitutionalism. Over a series of
articles, Balkin has argued that originalism and popular constitutionalism "are two sides of the same coin."' 3 9
Balkin's key move is to argue that originalism, properly understood, limits the role of interpretation to articulating the Constitution's determinate original meaning, while issues about application of
that meaning are the province of constitutional construction. 140 It is
here, in construction, that popular constitutional holds sway.14 1
137

E.g, Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262 n.8 (1970).

138 E.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003); Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620
(1996); see also G. Edward White, Histoicizingjudicial Scrutiny, 57 S.C. L. REV. 1, 3
(2005) (noting that scholars have identified "as many as six levels of scrutiny").
139 Balkin, supra note 16, at 549.
140 See id. at 566. This claim is supported by another proposition: the Constitution's original meaning is composed of relatively abstract principles. See id. at 554-57.
141 See id.
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Balkin's attempted fusion of originalism and popular constitutionalism, regardless of its success, 1 4 2 indicates that he believes he
bears a burden of persuasion. Balkin's burden is to show that, contrary to popular perception, originalism and popular constitutionalism really are compatible. Indeed, Balkin acknowledges that his
14 3
My arguments below
synthesis "may seem strange to some readers."
exists: why theory
perception
popular
this
why
of
raise the question
does not fit practice.
B.

The "HistoricalExplanation"

Returning to the three causes of the divergence between theory
and practice, the first explanation is that conservative and liberal legal
thoughtl 4 4 have natural homes in originalism and popular constitutionalism respectively. The modern revival of popular constitutionalism is, therefore, the return of liberal legal thought to its roots.
From its inception, modern liberal legal thought has contained a
145 Liberal legal thought
strong strain of popular constitutionalism.
1 4 6 Beginning in the latehas its origin in the Progressive Movement.
nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries, progressive legal thought
142 For criticism of Balkin's claims from an originalist perspective, see McGinnis &
Rappaport, OriginalMethods Originalism, supra note 16, at 785-86; McGinnis & Rappaport, InterpretivePrinciples, supranote 16, at 371. For criticism from a living constitutionalist perspective, see generally Leib, supra note 1.
143 Jack M. Balkin, OriginalMeaning and ConstitutionalRedemption, 24 CONST. COMMENT. 427, 428 (2007).
144 By conservative and liberal legal thought, I mean legal thought that advocates
for substantive legal norms and forms of analysis popularly considered consistent with
political conservative and liberal thought respectively.
145 By "modem" liberal legal thought I am distinguishing post-Progressive Era liberal legal thought from its predecessor. See RICHARD HUDELSON, MODERN POLITICAL
PHILOSOPHY 37 (1999) ("It is important not to confuse this classical liberalism with the
political ideology known as 'liberalism' in the United States in the twentieth century."); BRADLEY C.S. WATSON, LIVING CONSTITUTION, DYING FAITH 55 (2009) (arguing
that foundational American political views in the late-nineteenth century were "dead
or dying"); Gerald Gaus & Shane D. Courtland, Liberalism, at §2, in STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (2010), available at http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/liberalism (distinguishing "classical" from "new liberalism"); see also BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA,
LAW AS A MEANS TO AN END 60-61 (2006) (stating that the "close of the nineteenth
century and the opening of the twentieth was a period of great intellectual ferment"
that "fed the Progressive political movement").
146 See WATSON, supra note 145, at 194 (stating that there has occurred an "evolution of progressivism into liberalism"); see also Balkin, supra note 16, at 561 (arguing
that popular constitutionalism "arose in the early twentieth century due to innovations by Congress and by state and local governments in constructing early versions of
the regulatory state").
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was the legal manifestation of the social and political Progressive
Movement.147 A central tenet of progressive legal thought was its
commitment to popular interpretative supremacy.148
Liberal legal thought reached its apotheosis in the New Deal
Court's deference to and incorporation of popular legislative judgments. Backing away from the perceived 4' 9 judicial excesses of the
Lochner Court, the Supreme Court consciously sought to limit conflict
or tension with popular constitutional interpretation. It did this in
two primary ways: first, the New Deal Court deferred to popular constitutional judgments in the elected branches, for instance, by deferring to Congress's economic judgments in the Commerce Clause
context; 150 and second, it instantiated New Deal popular interpretative judgments,15 1 such as limits on contract rights, in its precedent.1 5 2

147 See WATSON, supra note 145, at 194 (tying liberal legal theory to Progressivism).
148 See O'NEILL, supra note 78, at 30 (describing claims for judicial updating of the
Constitution); WATSON, supra note 145, at 10, 15 (arguing that the Supreme Court,
beginning in the Progressive Era, adopted an interpretative methodology that was
flexible so as to respond to historically conditioned circumstances); WOLFE, supra
note 78, at 205-16 (describing Woodrow Wilson's claims regarding the Constitution).
149 There are strong reasons to believe that the traditional narrative told about the
pre-New Deal Court is misleading. The traditional narrative is that the Lochner Court
significantly restricted the ability of the federal and state governments to enact salutary legislation that responded to changing social conditions. See, e.g., Home Bldg. &
Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 442-43 (1934) (claiming that societal changes
mandated a re-evaluation of constitutional values); John Hart Ely, The Wages of Crying
Wolf A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920, 937 (1973) ("[T]he received learning has it, this sort of thing did happen before, repeatedly. From its 1905 decision in
Lochner v. New York into the 1930's the Court, frequently though not always under the
rubric of 'liberty of contract,' employed the Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth
and Fifth Amendments to invalidate a good deal of legislation."); see also David E.
Bernstein, Lochner v. New York: A Centennial Retrospective, 83 WASH. U. L. Q 1469,
1470-71 (2005) ("According to the prevailing myth propagated by Progressives and
New Dealers-and widely accepted even today-Supreme Court Justices of the Lochner period, influenced by pernicious Social Darwinist ideology, sought to impose their
laissez-faire views on the American polity through a tendentious interpretation of the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." (footnotes omitted)). In reality,
the Supreme Court's jurisprudence was generally favorable to federal and state legislation. See MICHAELJ. PHILLIPS, THE LOCHNER COURT, MYTH AND REALITY 31-32, 55
(2001).
150 For example, in its Commerce Clause case law, the New Deal Court deferred to
Congress's judgments on the impact of a class of intrastate activity on interstate commerce. See, e.g., Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 128-29 (1942).
151 See Balkin, supra note 16, at 561-62.
152 E.g., Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n, 290 U.S. at 442-43.
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At this point, because of its early-New Deal rulings, 15 3 the
Supreme Court had suffered considerable harm to its institutional
prestige and authority.' 5 4 Despite this, the Supreme Court issued
promissory notes of greater judicial intervention that came due during the Warren Court.15 5 Most famously, the New Deal Court articulated the basis for more rigorous judicial review in Carolene Products
Footnote Four.' 5 6
Liberal legal thought maintained its commitment to popular constitutionalism throughout the twentieth century though, as I describe
below, during the Warren Court era,' 5 7 this commitment was submerged. The principle post-war manifestation of liberal legal
thought's popular constitutionalism was found in the Legal Process
School.15 8 Legal Process had its principal home at Harvard Law
School,159 though it had prominent adherents on the Court 6 0 and
throughout the academy.16 1
For purposes of this Article, I will focus on one of Legal Process's
key tenets, institutional settlement.16 2 Institutional settlement is the
153 See, e.g., A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935)
(striking down the National Industry Recovery Act).
154 See ACKERMAN, TRANSFORMATIONS, supra note 12, at 119-20 (arguing that the
New Deal Court had to "reassure the still-suspicious President, Congress, and electorate that the justices had fully accepted the constitutional legitimacy of the New
Deal"); see also id. at 131 (describing the "New Deal Court confronting the shattering
consequences of the Roosevelt revolution").
155 See id. at 132 (finding that the Warren Court is "best underst[oo]d ... as a
continuation of the project of synthetic interpretation begun in the aftermath of the
Civil War ... and redirected in New Deal opinions like Carotene Products").
156 United States v. Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938); see also ACKERMAN, TRANSFORMATIONs, supra note 12, at 119-29 (describing how Footnote Four is a
Supreme Court attempt to synthesize the New Deal with prior constitutional
commitments).
157 I include the early Burger Court in this label because neither the Court's membership nor its jurisprudential views changed immediately upon ChiefJustice Burger's
appointment. See O'NEILL, sup-ra note 78, at 97 ("The Burger Court's bussing, abortion, and death penalty decisions made it clear that there had been no 'counterrevolution' against the liberal activism of the Warren Court."); see also TAMANAHA, supra
note 145, at 88 ("[T]he Burger Court was more activist than the Warren Court.").
158 SeeTAMANAHA, supranote 145, at 108 (stating that "most" Legal Process proponents "were liberals").
159 The most well-known proponents of Legal Process were Justice Frankfurter,
Henry Hart, Albert Sacks, and Lon Fuller. See TAMANAHA, supra note 145, at 102.
160 Justice Frankfurter was both an advocate of the School and a vehicle for its
creation because many of his prot6g6s went on to become prominent advocates.
161 Herbert Wechsler, for instance.
162 See TAMANAHA, supra note 145, at 104 (describing the principle of institutional
settlement).
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idea that legal systems should distribute decision-making authority for
particular legal issues to those institutions best suited to make the best
decisions, and other legal institutions should treat those decisions as
authoritative.1 6 3
The practical impact of this commitment is that the Supreme
Court should regularly defer to popular interpretative judgments.164
In fact, this is a major reason why Legal Process's influence waned.16 5
As it became more difficult for Legal Process advocates1 66 to justify the
Warren Court's cases, 167 liberal legal academics abandoned it168 and
the deference to popular interpretative judgments that went with it.169
The Warren Court, in an unprecedentedo7 0 host of areas,
rejected one of the two aspects of the New Deal Court's respect for
163 See Ernest Young, InstitutionalSettlement in a GlobalizingjudicialSystem, 54 DUKE
L.J. 1143, 1150 (2005).
164 See TAMANAHA, supra note 145, at 104 ("Legal process thought thus accorded
priority to legislatures, designating courts and administrative agencies as . . .
subordinate institutions . . . .").
165 Legal Process's influence decreased precipitously in the mid-to-late-1960s,
though its influence was challenged beginning in the 1950s. See id. at 108-17.
166 This result was not through a lack of effort on the part of Legal Process adherents. The most heroic example is Alexander Bickel. Bickel attempted to preserve the
core insights of Legal Process while at the same time justifying the Warren Court's
jurisprudence. See ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAsT DANGEROUS BRANCH 24 (2d ed.
1986) (describing the goals of his book explicitly in Legal Process terms).
167 The Warren Court's negative impact on Legal Process thinking is exemplified
by Bickel's later criticism of the Court. See ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE MORALITY OF
CONSENT (1975); ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE IDEA OF PROGRESS (1970).
168 See TAMANAHA, supra note 145, at 108 ("[T]he reformist decisions of the Warren Court could not be squared with basic legal process tenets. This conflict was all
the more painful for legal process theorists because most were liberals who shared in
the substantive aims of the Court.").
169 See id. at 112 (describing the Harvard Law Review editors' dedication of the
first issue of the eighty-third volume to ChiefJustice Warren who "led a reform of the
law while the other branches of government delayed" (internal quotation omitted)).
170 Literally. The Warren Court had the highest rate of overturning precedent of
any Supreme Court. See Christopher P. Banks, The Supreme Court and Precedent: An
Analysis of Natural Courts and Reversal Trends, 75 JUDICATURE 262, 264 (1992) (finding
that the Warren Court had the highest rate of overturning of any court); see also PHu,
LiP KURLAND, POLITICS, THE CONSTITUTION, AND THE WARREN COURT 90-91 (1970)
("The list of opinions destroyed by the Warren Court reads like a table of contents
from an old constitutional law casebook."); Lee J. Strang & Bryce G. Poole, The Historical (In)Accuracy of the Brandeis Dichotomy: An Assessment of the Two-Tiered Standardof Stare
Decisisfor Supreme Court Precedents,86 N.C. L. Rev. 969, 979-80 (2008) (describing the
increased rate of Supreme Court overrulings after 1932).
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popular judgments.1 7 ' The Warren Court, in the area of "fundamental" rights,17 2 rejected deference to popular constitutional judgments.
Instead, following hints from Carolene Products Footnote Four 73 and
the example of its Free Speech Clause jurisprudence,174 the Supreme
Court subjected an increasing array of governmental restrictions on
fundamental rights to "strict scrutiny."
To say that liberal legal thought's popular constitutionalism was
submerged during the Warren Court is not to say that it was absent.
Indeed, the Warren Court's most popular opinions, then and now, are
those that facilitated popular processes. For instance, the Court's voting rights cases rested on the claim that the results were dictated by
democratic principles.17 5 This line of cases formed the core of the
Legal Process school's most mature statement, found in John Hart
17
Ely's, Democracy and Distrust.
Liberal legal academics, especially those associated with the Legal
Process School, initially expressed significant misgivings about the
Court's assertions of judicial power.17 7 As the century progressed,
however, most liberal legal academics defended the Warren Court's
rulings,' 7 8 though frequently with apologies for the Court's own weak
justifications. 7 9 This was in large measure because liberal legal aca171 Most of these moves raised significant controversy, see TAMANAHA, supra note
145, at 108, though a few found welcome public reaction, such as the voting rights
cases that articulated the one-man-one-vote rule. See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533,
560-61 (1964).
172 The Supreme Court's fundamental rights doctrine was/is that some rights are
protected by the Constitution against infringement absent a compelling state interest.
See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Strict judicial Scrutiny, 54 UCLA L. REv. 1267 (2007)
(describing the origin and function of strict scrutiny).
173 United States v. Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
174 See WOLFE, supra note 78, at 184-99 (describing how the Court's free speech
jurisprudence was the first area where the Court utilized stricter judicial review).
175 See Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 555 ("The right to vote freely for the candidate of
one's choice is of the essence of a democratic society, and any restrictions on that
right strike at the heart of representative government.").

176

JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST:

A

THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW

(1980).
177 Perhaps the most famous example of this was Herbert Wechsler's criticism of
Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of ConstitutionalLaw, 73 HARv. L. REv. 1 (1959); see also O'NEILL, supra note 78, at
93 ("Unable to restrain the Court on its own terms, the troubled process tradition left
the way open for others who were more concerned about the role of history in
Supreme Court decision-making.").
178 See RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHrrs SERIOUSLY 124-30 (1977) (describing
how Roe fits Dworkin's conception of law as integrity).
179 See JED RUBENFELD, FREEDOM AND TIME 222 (2001) (describing attempts to
defend Roe as "merely reemphasiz[ing] the embarrassing sense of artifice, of post-hoc
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demics saw the Warren Court's pursuit of liberal substantive policies
worth defending.o8 0 Both liberal legal thought's initial refusal to
embrace the Warren Court's assertion of judicial power, and its eventual reluctant defense of judicial supremacy, indicate that liberal legal
thought was uneasy with Warren Court assertions of power.
Beginning with the Burger Court, and more earnestly with the
Rehnquist Court, the perception arose among liberal legal academics
that the Supreme Court was conservative and was likely to remain
S0181 for the foreseeable future.' 8 2 This caused liberal legal academics
to seriously question the claims of judicial power accepted since the
Warren Court. As a result, many liberal legal academics have
returned to their intellectual home in the form of popular
constitutionalism.18 3
Professor Richard Parker was liberal legal theory's John the Baptist.184 In his seminal 1980 article, The Past of Constitutional TheoryAnd its Future,'8 5 Parker "appeal[ed] to [his] generation" to reject
then-regnant justifications for judicial review' 8 6 and, in their place,
create "a political life far different-far more democratic-than the
one we know now."18 7 Today, numerous liberal legal academics have
taken up Parker's appeal. Professor Rebecca Zietlow echoes Parker
almost thirty years later:
rationalization, that has accompanied the right of privacy since the Supreme Court
first discerned it in the 'penumbras' and 'emanations' of the Bill of Rights"); Ely,
supra note 149, at 922-26 (repeatedly stating agreement with Roe's result, while
severely criticizing the Court's claims).
180 See Robert Post & Reva Siegel, Roe Rage: Democratic Constitutionalismand Backlash, 42 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 373, 373 (2007) ("Progressive confidence in constitutional adjudication peaked during the Warren Court and its immediate aftermath.").
181 Two factors played prominent roles in this re-evaluation by liberal legal academics: (1) the relatively more conservative rulings by the Supreme Court; and (2)
the frequency of Republican presidencies and those Presidents' relatively conservative
judicial appointments.
182 See Post & Siegel, supranote 180, at 373 ("[P] rogressive attitudes toward constitutional adjudication have recently begun to splinter and diverge."); see also Friedman, supra note 18, at 2603 ("[P]rogressives and conservatives tend to switch sides
depending on what courts are doing.").
183 See KRAMER, supra note 10, at 225 (arguing that a conservative Supreme Court,
beginning in the 1980s, broadened judicial interpretative supremacy).
184 John the Baptist called the Jewish people to repentance and thereby prepared
the way forJesus' public ministry. See Matthew 3:6 ("And were baptized by him in the
Jordan, confessing their sins.").
185 Parker, supra note 11.
186 Id. at 223.
187 Id. at 257.
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[A] t the turn of the twenty-first century, legal reformers seem to
underappreciate the value of participation and democracy to defining and expanding our national community. For the past generation, too many legal reformers have focused primarily on the
litigation process, favoring test cases over political action, despite
the fact that appointments by conservative presidents have made
the federal courts increasingly hostile to rights of belonging over
recent years. Meanwhile, a decreasing proportion of our voting
population participates in elections because many people feel that
the issues that concern them the most simply are not addressed
within the political process. While the political process is far from
perfect, democracy retains its potential for providing an effective
forum of debate over the issues that are the most meaningful to our
lives.188
In sum, liberal legal thought's traditional home is popular constitutionalism. Liberal legal thought, though enamored of the Warren
Court's substantive results, backed away from judicial supremacy once
the Supreme Court ceased to deliver predictable liberal policies. Popular constitutionalism is today's manifestation of liberal legal
thought's traditional commitments.
On the other hand, conservative legal thought's natural home is
originalism1 89 because both have the purpose to preserve and instantiate traditional-social and legal-norms. 9 0 Modern American conservative thought, as a coherent intellectual movement, originated in
the late-1940s. 19 1 Conservative thought was composed of a number of
strands,19 2 and the movement found voice in its seminal statement,
188 ZIETLOW, supra note 17, at 168.
189 See Whittington, supra note 2, at 30 ("[C]onservatives are generally more likely
than liberals to find originalism a normatively attractive approach to constitutional
interpretation.").
190 See, e.g., RUSSELL KIRK, THE CONSERVATIVE CONSTITUTION 4, 19-33 (1990)
(arguing that the Constitution embodied the conservative principles of the American
Revolution).

191

See GEORGE H. NASH,

THE CONSERVATIVE INTELLECTUAL MOVEMENT IN AMERICA

3 (1998) (placing the birth of the modern conservative intellectual movement in 1945
with the publication of Friedrich Hayek's The Road to Serfdom); see also GODFREY HODGSON, THE WORLD TURNED RIGHT SIDE Up 23 (1996) (using the mid-1940s as the birth
date).
192 The conservative intellectual movement's strands included: (1) anti-communism that arose following the advent of the Cold War; (2) those who argued for traditional religious beliefs, including advocacy of natural law; and (3) advocates of
classical liberalism. See HODGSON, supra note 191, at 17-18; see alsoWhittington, supra
note 2, at 32 (describing conservatism as containing libertarians, religious conserva-

tives, national security hawks, business conservatives, and neoconservatives).
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Russell Kirk's, The ConservativeMind, in 1953.'19 Conservative thought
manifested itself in many areas of American life including the legal
realm.19 4 In the legal academy, conservative legal thought
struggled.1 9 5
Two of the conservative intellectual movement's central commitments make originalism its most compatible theory of constitutional
interpretation.19 6 First, modern conservative thought focuses on preserving traditional norms of human conduct.'9 7 The America that created the Constitution is the standard of what is "traditional" in the
United States. Originalism, by making authoritative the norms earlyAmerican society embedded in the Constitution, does just this. It preserves, and the norms it preserves are traditional.' 9 8
Second, conservative thought prescribes norms for individuals
and society that generally fall under the label conservative.' 99
Originalism, applied to the American Constitution, regularly results in
conservative outputs. 2 0 0 For example, Americans in 1791 strongly
193

RUSSELL KIRK, THE CONSERVATIVE MIND (7th rev. ed. 2001).
194 In the political realm, the conservative intellectual movement's first major
impact was Barry Goldwater's presidential campaign. See HODGSON, supra note 191, at
91-92. In the media, William F. Buckley founded National Review, America's most
prominent conservative media outlet, in 1955. See id. at 78.
195 See STEVEN M. TELEs, THE RISE OF THE CONSERVATIVE LEGAL MOVEMENT 41-46
(2008); see also Mark Tushnet, What Consequences Do Ideas Have?, 87 TEX. L. REv. 447
(2008) (reviewing Teles' book and describing three mechanisms that the conservative
legal movement utilized to challenge liberal legal thought's institutional hegemony).
196 Keith Whittington has argued that originalism and conservatism are not necessarily related, and that other ways of interpreting the Constitution may better suit
conservatives. See Whittington, supra note 2, at 33-34. However, Whittington
acknowledges that "many conservative legal scholars have at least rhetorically
embraced some form of originalism." Id. at 33. Furthermore, he seems to concede
that originalism and conservatism in fact overlap when he notes that "[o]ther jurisprudential theories could provide a better fit with conservati[sm]." Id. (emphasis
added).
197 See KIRK, supra note 193, at 9 ("Custom, convention, and old prescription are
checks both upon man's anarchic impulse and upon the innovator's lust for power.").
198 See Whittington, supra note 2, at 40 (describing originalism as "backward
looking").
199 See KIRK, supra note 193, at 8-9 (describing the tenets of conservatism which
include a commitment to natural law, subsidiarity, natural ordering, private property,
tradition, and resistance to change).
200 See Lee J. Strang, Originalism and the "Challenge of Change": Abduced-Principle
Originalism and Other Mechanisms by Which OriginalismSufficiently Accommodates Changed
Social Conditions, 60 HASTINGS L.J. 927, 935 (2009); see also THE HERITAGE GUIDE TO
THE CONSTITUTION (Edwin Meese III et al. eds., 2005) (providing a clause-by-clause

analysis of the Constitution's original meaning).
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embraced widespread gun ownership,2 0 1 a position generally considered conservative today. 202 As another example, the Establishment
Clause's original meaning permits significant interaction between
religion and the state,20 3 a position solidly within today's conservative
mainstream. 204 This conclusion is also bolstered by the claims made
by Progressives that the Constitution's original meaning was outdated. 205 These reasons for conservatism's embrace of originalism are
borne out by the practical reality that most prominent originalists are
conservative.2 0 6
In sum, the primary reason popular constitutionalism and
originalism have failed to converge in practice is that liberal legal academics and conservative legal academics make their homes in the
respective theories. On this reading, popular constitutionalism is liberal legal thought's return to its natural intellectual home after wandering during the Warren Court era. This explanation accounts for
the accurate perception that popular constitutionalists tend toward
liberalism while originalists tend toward conservatism.
C.

The "SociologicalExplanation"

The second of the three causes of the divergence between theory
and practice is sociological factors. This explanation builds on my
previous claim that popular constitutionalists tend to be liberal while
originalists tend to be conservative. Originalism's modem incarna201 See Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 610 (1994) ("[T]here is a long tradition of widespread lawful gun ownership by private individuals in this country.");
James Lindgren &Justin L. Heather, Counting Guns in Early America, 43 Wm. & MARY
L. REV. 1777, 1778 (2002) (describing original research that led the authors to conclude that rates of gun ownership in Founding America were "particularly high");

James Lindgren, Fall From Grace: Arming America and the Bellesiles Scandal, 111 YALE
L.J. 2195, 2197 (2002) ("Household gun ownership in early America was more wide).
spread than today ....

202 See 2008 Republican Platform 51, http://www.gop.com/2008Platform/2008plat
form.pdf [hereinafter 2008 Republican Platform] (last visited Sept. 12, 2011) (stating
the party's commitment to an individual right to keep and bear arms).
203 The best book-length analyses on the Clause's original meaning are ROBERT L.
CORD, SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE (1982); DONALD L. DRAKEMAN, CHURCH,
STATE, AND ORIGINAL INTENT (2010); and PHILIP HAMBURGER, SEPARATION OF CHURCH
AND STATE

(2002).

204 See 2008 Republican Platform, supra note 202, at 53 (criticizing "judicial rulings
which attempt to drive faith out of the public arena"); see also RICHARD JOHN NEUHAUS, THE NAKED PUBLIC SQUARE (2d ed. 1986) (arguing for a robust role for religiously-informed voices in the public square).
205 See WOLFE, supra note 78, at 205-16.

206 Using the label conservative
libertarians.

capaciously

to include conservatives and
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tion arose as a critique of the Warren and Burger Courts.2 0 7 One goal
of this critique was to undermine and overturn the Courts' liberal rulings,20 8 a goal amenable to legal conservatives. 2 09 Consequently,
originalists were outsiders in a legal academy that favored the Warren
and Burger Courts' decisions.
One result of this estrangement between originalists and the legal
academy was that originalism "got a bad name."2 10 Originalism was
simply "conservatism's legal guise." 2 11 If one wished to be a successful
member of the legal academy, one did not advocate originalism.
Since liberal legal thought dominated 212 the legal academy, and
with originalism so closely identified with conservatism, liberal legal
academics unhappy with the direction of the Supreme Court were
forced to look for jurisprudential solace somewhere other than
originalism. Popular constitutionalism is just such a home. For
instance, Rebecca Zietlow explained that her move toward popular
constitutionalism was the result of recent Supreme Court rulings that
seemed to limit civil rights protection, which prompted her to look to
the federal and state legislatures as "protectors of rights."2 1 3
D.

The "Realist Explanation"

Third, originalism diverges from popular constitutionalism,
despite the theoretical possibility of its affinity, because of the political
207 See O'NEILL, supra note 78, at 95 ("By the mid-1970s recurrence to original
constitutional meaning was a notable feature of work critical of recent liberal reformist uses of modern judicial power."); see also Solum, Evolution, supra note 62, at 6-8
(describing the early work of Robert Bork and then-Justice Rehnquist).
208 See O'NEILL, supra note 78, at 94-95, 107.
209 See Whittington, supranote 2, at 29 (describing originalism's "modem form" as
"a response to the liberal constitutional decisions of the Warren and Burger Courts").
210 See O'NEILL, supra note 78, at 123-29 (describing the legal academy's hostile
reception to Raoul Berger's, Government by the judiciary).
211 See id. at 134 ("[C]ritics sometimes dismissed originalism as nothing more than
a partisan ploy to advance the immediate policy goals of the conservative coalition

212 And continues to dominate. SeeJohn 0. McGinnis et al., The Patternsand Implications of PoliticalContributions by Elite Law School Faculty, 93 GEO. L.J. 1167, 1170 (2005)
(finding that of politically active law professors at the nation's top-twenty law schools,
"81% of law faculty members in the study who make political contributions contribute
wholly or predominately to Democrats"); see also Edward Rubin, CurricularStress, 60 J.
LEGAL EDUc. 110, 112 (2010) ("To be sure, many law professors-probably a substantial majority-have liberal rather than conservative political views . . . ."); Jared A.
Goldstein, Can PopularConstitutionalismSurvive the Tea Party Movement, 105 Nw. U. L.
REV. 288, 299 (2011) (acknowledging the force of the claim that "liberal law professors . . . have been the principal proponents" of popular constitutionalism).
213 ZIETLOW, supra note 17, at ix.
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orientation of its proponents. Originalism and popular constitutionalism have tended to diverge on two points: first, originalists have

argued for relatively conservative interpretations of the Constitution;
and, second, originalists have moved away from popular constitutionalism on the five axes.
Although it is difficult to quantify the relative political position of
originalism, one way to measure this is by looking at originalists' concrete interpretative conclusions. Using the contentious area of the
Commerce Clause as a test case reveals relatively conservative interpretations. 214 The most prominent originalist interpretation of the Commerce Clause's original meaning is found in Randy Barnett's work.
2 16 Professor Barnett mainOver a series of articles2 15 and in a book,
tained that the Commerce Clause authorizes Congress "to specify how
a rightful activity may be transacted[,] and the power to prohibit
wrongful acts" in "the trade or exchange of goods[,] including the
means of transporting them[,] . . . between persons of one state and

another." 2 17 On the other hand, nonoriginalists have generally
argued that Wickard v. Filburn's2 1 8 capacious interpretation is
correct. 2 19
214 A concrete example of this phenomenon is that challengers to the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010), have utilized this interpretation of the Commerce Clause, see Memorandum in Opposition to
Motion to Dismiss at 22-26, Virginia v. Sebelius, 702 F. Supp. 2d 598 (E.D. Va. 2010)
(No. 3:10cv188) (making originalist arguments regarding the Commerce Clause's
meaning); Randy Barnett, Is Health Insurance Mandate Constitutional?, THE VoLoKiI
CONSPIRACY (Dec. 9, 2009, 10:45 AM), http://volokh.com/2009/12/09/conspiratorsat-heritage-today (stating that the individual mandate is "quite obviously, beyond the
original public meaning of the enumerated powers scheme"), while supporters have
advocated for other interpretations. See Memorandum in Support of Defendant's
Motion to Dismiss at 20-23, Sebelius, 702 F. Supp. 2d 598 (No. 3:10cv188) (making
nonoriginalist arguments regarding the Commerce Clause's meaning).
215 See Randy E. Barnett, New Evidence of the OriginalMeaning of the Commerce Clause,
55 ARK. L. REv. 847 (2003); Randy E. Barnett, The Original Meaning of the Commerce
Clause, 68 U. CHI. L. REv. 101 (2001).
216 See BARNETT, supra note 58, at 313.
217 Id.; see also Robert G. Natelson & David Kopel, Commentary, Commerce in the
Commerce Clause: A Response to Jack Balkin, 109 MIcH. L. REv. FIRST IMPRESSIONs 55, 56
(2010) ("There is little question that the ordinary and common meaning of 'commerce' . . . was mercantile trade and traditionally associated activities.").
218 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
219 See generally Grant S. Nelson & Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Rethinking the Commerce
Clause: Applying First Principles to Uphold Federal Commercial Regulations but Preserve State
Control Over Social Issues, 85 IowA L. REV. 1, 7-8 (1999) (describing three nonoriginalist approaches to interpreting the Commerce Clause following Lopez); see alsoJackM.
Balkin, Commerce, 109 MIcH. L. REv. 1, 1, 34 (2010) (using his "text and principle"
method of interpretation to conclude that " Wickard is a fairly easy case").
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Another piece of evidence that originalists tend toward conservatism is provided by the recent influx of "new" originalists. Over the
past decade, originalism has seen an influx of new proponents along
with a host of proposed refinements. 220 Many originalists have
resisted both the influx and the refinements at least in part because
they may result in the liberal reorientation of originalism. 2 1 This
resistance by "old" originalists suggests that originalism has, until very
recently, tended toward conservative constitutional interpretations. 2 2 2
Second, and relatedly, originalists in practice have tended to
pivot on the five axes away from popular constitutionalists. I
described in Part II.B how originalism is theoretically compatible with
popular constitutionalism. However, in Part II.C, I showed that
originalism, as currently articulated by scholars, has failed to converge
with popular constitutionalism.
In none of the axes identified above have a majority of originalists pivoted toward popular constitutionalism. This fact decisively prevents originalism from aligning with popular constitutional in
practice. On one axis, originalism has clearly moved away from popular constitutionalism; there are few originalists who counsel judicial
deference to popular interpretative judgments.
With the other four axes, though there is no obvious majority
position, the axes clearly do not pivot toward popular constitutionalism. There is no originalist consensus on departmentalism, the extent
to which the Constitution's original meaning permits the popular
branches to engage in authoritative constitutional interpretation, the
extent to which the popular branches authoritatively construct constitutional meaning, and whether originalism includes a place for
nonoriginalist precedent.
As a result, popular constitutionalism and originalism have
diverged because, in specifying originalism, originalists have moved it
away from popular constitutionalism. This has taken the form of con220 The most-cited telling of this story is found at Keith E. Whittington, The New
Originalism, 2 GEo. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 599, 603-12 (2004). More recently, Professor
PeterJ. Smith has described originalism's modification and argued that these changes
have diminished if not eliminated remaining distinctions between originalism and
nonoriginalism. Peter J. Smith, How Different Are Originalism and Non-Originalism?,62
HASTINGs L.J. 707, 725-30 (2011).
221 See Smith, supra note 220, at 707; see also Steven D. Smith, That Old-Time
Originalism 10-15 (Univ. of San Diego Sch. of Law Legal Studies Research Paper
Series, Paper No. 08-028, 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1150447 (arguing that the influx of new originalists may cause originalism to disintegrate).
222 See Smith, supra note 220, at 710 (arguing that "old" originalists' "rejection of
the new . . . originalists' claims" shows that they are committed to "an approach to
constitutional interpretation that usually produces substantively conservative results").
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servative constitutional interpretations along with movement on the
five axes away from popular constitutionalism.
This ideological divergence between liberals and conservatives,
and popular constitutionalism and originalism, is not necessarily
unprincipled. Instead, as Keith Whittington has argued, "many political liberals are likely to balk at the philosophical foundations of
originalism, while many conservatives will likely find those founda2 25
tions to be compatible with their broader philosophical beliefs."
CONCLUSION

In this Article, I argued that originalism and popular constitutionalism are not, in principle, friends or enemies. Instead, since
originalism's focal case leaves the question open, it depends on how
originalism pivots on the five axes I identified. I described how various versions of originalism pivot toward or away from popular constitutionalism. In the end, one cannot say definitively whether
originalism and popular constitutionalism are similar until one determines which conception of originalism is correct.
Then, in Part III, I offered three explanations for what would otherwise be an odd situation: originalism and popular constitutionalism
are theoretically compatible, but are widely-regarded as incompatible,
and in fact have not converged in practice. My first explanation was
that conservative and liberal legal thought have natural homes in
originalism and popular constitutionalism respectively. The second
cause of the divergence is sociological factors in the legal academy.
Third, in practice, originalism diverges from popular constitutionalism in its substantive interpretations and its practical specification
because of its proponents' ideological orientation.

223 Whittington, supra note 2, at 38-39.
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